

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 FEA-01 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00

CIEP-01 COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07 FPC-01 H-02 INR-07

INT-05 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06

SAM-01 OES-03 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 EA-07 FRB-03

IO-10 NEA-10 OPIC-03 LAB-04 SIL-01 /130 W

----- 004972

R 231208Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7630

INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 19636

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG UK OECD

SUBJECT: IEA: REPORTING ON CRUDE OIL COSTS

EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM W.N.T. ROBERTS, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AS PART OF UK CONTRIBUTION TO IEA/SOM STUDY ON REPORTING OF CRUDE OIL COSTS. OTHER ADDRESSEES ARE E.G. BRYANT (IEA PARIS), N. COLE (IEA PARIS), DR. VOGLER (FRG MISSION TO OECD, PARIS) AND E. ROSSONI (MIN OF INDUSTRY, ROME). BEGIN TEXT:
SUBJECT: IEA/SOM REPORTING OF CRUDE OIL COSTS
REFERENCE: IEA/SOM (75) 52

- (1) THE OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE IS TO PROTECT DATA FROM:
 - (A) INTERCEPTION BEFORE DELIVERY INTO IEA COMPUTER
 - (B) UNAUTHORISED RETRIEVAL AFTER THIS DELIVERY.
- (2) THE US PROPOSAL IS NOT ABSOLUTELY PROOF AGAINST EITHER RISK BECAUSE:
EVEN IDENTICAL PUNCH CARDS FROM SAME BATCH COULD BE MARKED INVISIBLY BEFORE DESPATCH TO COUNTRIES FOR PUNCHING, AND ACCEPTANCE PROGRAMME COULD BE IN DUPLICATE WITH ONE PROGRAMME FOR SCRUTINY AND TESTING

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BY COUNTRIES AND ANOTHER, EMBODYING RETRIEVAL

FACILITY, FOR POSSIBLE IMPROPER USE.

(3) MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED PROCEDURE WOULD BE NEEDED TO OBTAIN 100 PERCENT SECURITY. IS IT REALLY WORTH SEEKING GREATER SECURITY THAN INPUTTING DATA BY RANDOM ARRIVAL TIME FOR EACH COUNTRY BUT WITHOUT COUNTRY IDENTIFICATION DURING A PRESCRIBED PERIOD BY A DEDICATED LINE FROM SECURITY CLEARED COMPUTER BUREAU? DETAILS FOLLOW IN SHORT PAPER.

THE SECURITY OF CRUDE COST DATA TRANSMISSION
TO THE IEA (IEA/SOM(75)2)
(NOTE BY UNITED KINGDOM)

THE STAGES OF DATA TRANSMISSION FROM A LOCAL CLEARED BUREAU TO THE IEA PARIS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A) FROM THE BUREAU TO THE LOCAL EXCHANGE.
- B) FROM THE LOCAL EXCHANGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE WITHIN THE UK. POSSIBLY VIA A GROUP SWITCHING CENTRE BUT UNLIKELY FOR A LONDON BASED BUREAU.
- C) FROM THE UK INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE TO THE FRENCH INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE.
- D) FROM THE FRENCH INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE TO THE EXCHANGE LOCAL FOR THE IEA.
- E) THENCE TO THE IEA.

THE STAGES FROM, AND INCLUDING (C) ARE RELATIVELY SECURE (SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE IEA FOR THE PROCESSING OF THE DATA) PROVIDED THAT THE DATA BEAR NO INDICATOR TO THEIR ORIGIN. THE SUGGESTION CONTAINED IN THE USA DELEGATION PAPER THAT A RETURNING COUNTRY CARD SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITH THE DATA WOULD RUIN THESE PROPOSALS. WITHOUT SUCH A CARD ANY PERSON TAPPING THE LINE AT THESE POINTS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING THE CHANNEL CARRYING THE INFORMATION AND THEN WOULD SEE ONLY AMORPHOUS BLOCKS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM ONE ANOTHER.

OF STAGES (A) AND (B), (A) IS BY FAR THE MOST VULNERABLE AND ENCODING WOULD BE THE ONLY SATISFACTORY BUT EXPENSIVE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOLUTION.

(B) IS LESS VULNERABLE BECAUSE OF THE SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO LOCATE THE LINE CARRYING THE INFORMATION BUT IT CAN BE DONE.

IF ENCODING WERE TO BE CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INSTALL THE DECODER IN PARIS AND GAIN THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE ENCODER INSTALLATION AT THE TRANSMITTING POINT IN

EACH COUNTRY; INVOLVING THE CONSENT OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS PEOPLE IF THIS DID NOT ALREADY EXIST.

ENCODING HAS AN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE HOWEVER. THE DIFFICULTY WITH A SINGLE BLIND TRANSMISSION IS THAT ERROR FREE RECEIPT CANNOT BE GUARANTEED. YET I UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS USUAL TO INCORPORATE ERROR CHECKS IN ENCODING/DECODING

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 19636

SYSTEMS WHICH APPRECIABLY REDUCE THE CHANCES OF ERROR IN THE RECEIVED MESSAGE.

THE SYSTEM COULD WORK AS FOLLOWS. COUNTRIES ARE ASKED TO TRANSMIT WHENEVER THEY WISH OVER A PERIOD OF, SAY, TWO DAYS. IDEALLY THE TIME OF TRANSMISSION WOULD BE CHOSEN, BY THEMSELVES, AT RANDOM. AT THE END OF THE SPECIFIED TWO DAYS A COMPUTER ROUTINE AT THE IEA WOULD COUNT THE NUMBER OF RECORDS RECEIVED AND COMPARE THIS

WITH THE NUMBER EXPECTED. IF ALL WERE PRESENT THEN PROCESSING WOULD COMMENCE, IF NOT THEN A TELEX WOULD BE SENT TO ALL COUNTRIES NOTIFYING THEM THAT INCOMPLETE DATA HAD BEEN RECEIVED. THE MISSING DATA COULD THEN BE TRANSMITTED DURING THE NEXT DAY AND PROCESSING COMMENCE. THE REACTION OF THE SYSTEM TO TOO MANY RECORDS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS TO BE DONE ON THEM.

THIS PROCESS COULD BE IMPROVED AT THE COST OF REQUIRING
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REPORTING COUNTRIES TO MAKE THREE SEPARATE REPORTS IN RANDOM ORDER AND AT DIFFERENT TIMES. IF THEY WERE TO REPORT, FOR EXAMPLE, COUNTRY, AND AT A LATER TIME NUMBER OF RECORDS WHICH SHOULD BE (OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN) TRANSMITTED, AND LATER STILL THE DATA, AT THE END OF THE TWO DAYS THE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE REPORTED AND HOW MANY RECORDS IT SHOULD HAVE. I AM ASSUMING THAT THE USA REQUIREMENT WAS TO KNOW ONLY THE NAMES OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD REPORTED RATHER THAN REQUIRING THE NAME TO BE LINKED TO ITS DATA. END TEXT.

RICHARDSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
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Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PETROLEUM, REPORTS, DATA, PRICES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 DEC 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975LONDON19636
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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
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Margaret P. Grafeld
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